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Internet Regulation: Foreign Actors and Local
Harms - at the Crossroads of Pornography, Hate
Speech, and Freedom of Expression
I. Introduction
The Internet, like the telephone and the printing press, has
revolutionized the way people communicate, providing a global
audience with instant access to a wealth of political, cultural, and
scientific data. Recent figures estimate that there are at least 580
million Internet users.1 Individuals from around the globe can
exchange emails, join chat rooms and post information on
electronic bulletin boards. What sets the Internet apart from other
mediums of communication is its decentralization and its
openness.' As a result, individuals can use the Internet to
circumvent repressive governmental restrictions on freedom of
speech, and thus many governments fear the Internet as a threat to
regime stability because it can be used as a tool to organize
opposition.' Unfortunately, though, there is a much darker and
sinister side to the Internet, one full of hate speech and
pornography. Neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and terrorists have
all used the Internet to spread their form of hate.4 Sexual deviants
have used the Internet to exchange pictures of children being
I Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government
Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 1, n.77 (June 10, 2001) at
http://www.Columbia.edu/cu/strl/html/volume2/frischmannintro.html (citing Nua
Internet Surveys, at http://www.nua.com/surveys/how-many-online/world.html) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
2 Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual
World, 82 MINN. L. REv. 609, 618 (1998).
3 See Kristina M. Reed, From the Great Firewall of China to the Berlin Firewall:
The Cost of Content Regulation on Internet Commerce, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAw 451, 461
(Fall 2000).
4 Peter Finn, Neo-Nazis Sheltering Web Sites in the U.S.; German Courts Begin
International Pursuit, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2000, at Al; John Schwartz, Advocates of
Internet Fear Drive to Restrict Extremists'Access, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1995, at A22.
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forcibly raped and sodomized;5
In the face of this threat to public safety and morals, many
nations have enacted legislation to combat hate speech and
pornography.6 However, given the transnational nature of the
Internet, some legal scholars argue that the Internet defies
regulation at the national level.7 This paper examines the two
main obstacles that nations encounter when they try to regulate
Internet content at the national level.
The first obstacle is that of extraterritorial jurisdiction.8 While
a nation certainly has the right to regulate conduct and content
within its territory, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to
whether a nation can regulate Internet content originating from
outside its borders.' This paper explores two theories of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the objective territorial jurisdiction
principle and the universal jurisdiction principle, and whether they
apply to the Internet."° In particular, there will be a great amount
of discussion devoted to the objective territorial principle and
"targeting-based analysis," which arguably is a refined subset of
the objective territorial principle. 1
The second obstacle to national regulation of the Internet is
posed by the international norms of free expression as espoused by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.12  In examining these
norms, this paper will attempt to ascertain whether there are any
limits to national regulations of the Internet, and if so, what those
limits are. The problem particular to international norms of free
expression. is that there is no single definition as to what
5 Jack Simons, U.S., 13 Countries Launch Crackdown on Alleged Internet
Pedophile Group, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1998, at B8.
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
8 This paper only examines whether a nation can legally exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction to proscribe acts originating outside of its borders, and not whether a nation
in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction can actually enforce its judgments.
9 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1375-76 (1996).
10 The objective territorial principle is often also referred to as the "effects"
doctrine. See Sanjay S. Mody, National Cyberspace Regulation: Unbundling the
Concept of Jurisdiction, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 365, 375 (2001).
11 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part IV.
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constitutes pornography or hate speech."3 What one nation views
as art, another nation views as smut. What one nation views as
political discussion, another nation views as a threat to state
security. This paper will explore the possibility that at a
minimum, there is some universal agreement as to what is
acceptable and unacceptable speech. However, before this paper
broaches the topics of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the
international norms of freedom of expression, it will first provide
the reader with a brief history of the Internet and an introduction to
how different nations within the past seven years have attempted
to regulate Internet content at their respective national levels. 4
II. Background
Created by the U.S. Department of Defense in the 1960s, "the
Internet is an ever-increasing number of computer networks that
communicate via telephone lines."' 5  Originally designed to
facilitate the free exchange of ideas and scientific findings
between the government and government-funded researchers, 6 the
Internet has evolved from a product of the Cold War into a truly
revolutionary tool of mass communication. 7 As of the year 2002,
there were an estimated 580 million Internet users.' 8  This
phenomenal growth is expected to continue with projections
indicating that there will be 765 million Internet users by the year
2005.19
However, one of the by-products of this phenomenal growth is
that nations have become alarmed by the potential threat that
Internet hate speech and pornography posed to national security
and morals, and have begun to enact legislation to combat this
13 See Hertzberg and Others v. Finland, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 61/1979, at 126, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/OP/l (1982) (noting that
when it comes to public morals there is no universally applicable common standard).
14 See infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
15 Reed, supra note 3, at 456.
16 O'Rourke, supra note 2, at 615.
17 Kelly M. Doherty, www. obscenity~com: An Analysis of Obscenity and Indecency
Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REv. 259, 260-62 (1999) (noting that the
Internet has grown from a network of computers designed to withstand a nuclear attack
to a web of networks with over 70 million users alone in the United States).
18 Frischmann, supra note 1.
19 Margaret Khayat Bratt & Norbert F. Kugele, Who's In Charge?, 80 MICH. BAR
J. 42, 43 (Aug. 20, 2001).
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problem. 20  In 1996, the Chinese government enacted a
comprehensive set of Internet regulations composed of five
chapters designed to protect state security and morality. 2' The
Chinese government went so far in its regulations as to require
individuals to register with the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications before using the Internet as well as
mandating that all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) actively assist
the Ministry of Public Safety in discovering users who violate
these regulations.22 In 1998, the Malaysian state police established
an Internet unit under Malaysia's Internal Security Act to monitor
sites and newsgroups.23
However, it is not only the developing world that has
attempted to regulate content on the Internet. For example,
German officials in 1997 brought charges against CompuServe
Deutschland, its managing director, Mr. Felix Somm, and
Compuserve USA for making "accessible to the public
pornographic writings containing acts of violence, sexual abuse of
children and sex acts between human beings and animals" in
violation of the German criminal code.24 Mr. Somm's conviction
was eventually overturned, 25 but not before the German parliament
enacted the Information and Communications Services Act
(ICSA).26 ICSA made ISPs liable for any original content, but
provided some relief for ISPs from liability for third party content
as long as the ISP was not "knowingly" acting as a conduit for
illegal content.27
20 Mark Konkel, Internet Indecency, International Censorship, and Service
Providers'Liability, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 453 (2000).
21 Reed, supra note 3, at 462 (explaining that Chapter 1 enumerates what types of
activities are deemed illegal, that Chapters 2 and 3 outline the responsibilities of the
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the Ministry of Public Security in administering the
networks, and that Chapters 4 and 5 establish penalties for violations).
22 Id.
23 Konkel, supra note 20, at 468.
24 Id. at 460.
25 Id at 463-64 (explaining that Somm's conviction was overturned on the grounds
that he did not actively distribute pornographic materials).
26 Informations-und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz - IuKDG (Teledienstegesetz
[TDG]) art. I, § 5(1) (1997) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.iid.de/iukdg/gesetz/
iukdge.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
27 Kim L. Rappaport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in
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In May 2000, the Superior Court of Paris held both Yahoo
France and its American-based parent, Yahoo! Inc., liable for
violating article R.645-1 28 of the French criminal code which
prohibits the exposition of Nazi objects for the purpose of sale.29
Yahoo! Inc., argued that the French court did not have jurisdiction
over it because its servers are located on American soil, its
services are primarily directed at its American audience, and that
any ruling by the French court limiting speech would conflict with
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. ° Judge Gomez
who presided over the case rejected Yahoo! Inc.'s argument and
ordered Yahoo! Inc. to take all measures necessary to make it
impossible to access Nazi auction sites as well as any other site or
service offering an apology for Nazism or questioning whether
Nazi crimes occurred.3 After granting a two-month reprieve
during which a group of experts ascertained that it was
technologically feasible for Yahoo! Inc. to install blocking
software, the court granted Yahoo! Inc. three months to block
access or begin paying a 100,000 franc (US$13,000) fine per day
once the three months had expired.32 Eventually, Yahoo! Inc.
agreed to monitor its global auction site for Nazi-related objects
and speech.33
Finally, in December 2000, Germany's highest court, the
Bundesgerichthof, went so far as to hold that an Australian based
website could be subject to Germany's criminal provisions against
pro-Nazi speech and denial of the Holocaust.34 Unlike its earlier
Western Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 765, 792-93 (1998) (noting that ISPs are liable if they knowingly allow
access to illegal content and "it is technically possible and reasonable to prevent it").
28 CODE C1VIL [C. PlN.] art. R. 645-1 (Fr.).
29 Yaman Akdeniz, Case Analysis of League Against Racism and Antisemitism
(LICRA), French Union of Jewish Students v. Yahoo! Inc. (USA), Yahoo France,
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (The County Court of Paris), Interim Court
Order, 1(3) Electronic Business Law Reports, 110, 3 (2001), at http://www.cyber-
rights.org/documents/yahoo_ya.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
30 Id. 5; Bratt & Kugele, supra note 19, at 44.
31 Akdeniz, supra note 29, 4; Bratt & Kugele, supra note 19, at 44.
32 Bratt & Kugele, supra note 19, at 44.
33 Mahasti Razavi & Thaima Samman, Yahoo! and Limitations of the Global
Village, 19 CoMM. LAW. 27, 28 (Spring 2001).
34 Id. at 28-29.
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prosecution of CompuServe and its German subsidiary
CompuServe Deutschland, the German court exerted jurisdiction
over an Australian citizen, Mr. Frederick Toben, whose only
contact with Germany was having been born there.35 A judge in
this case ordered an arrest warrant for Mr. Toben.36 Toben was
informed that if he returns to Germany he will. face charges for the
racist contents of his Internet site.37
What all of these examples prove is that many nations,
including Western democracies, that have a strong tradition of
protecting free expression are willing to exert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and nations who have, at
best, only the most minimal of contacts with the forum state. The
fear among Internet proponents is that national legislation directed
at regulating Internet content will lead to ever increasing
restrictions on the free flow of information, thus reducing the
Internet's utility.38  While these fears may be well justified, this
paper will not discuss the normative arguments as to whether the
Internet should be regulated, but will instead explore the positive
law to determine whether, under international law, the Internet can
be regulated.
IlI. Jurisdictional Arguments
a) Introduction
Whether the Internet can be regulated at all under the
principles of international law is a matter of some dispute.39 Critics
of Internet regulation, such as David R. Johnson and David Post,
40
argue that territorial concepts of jurisdiction prevalent in law do
not apply to the Internet because cyberspace lacks any
35 Id.
36 Id. at 29.
37 Jeremy Jones, Australian Jews take Holocaust denier to court, THE JERUSALEM
POST, April 18, 2001, at 9.
38 See Mody, supra note 10, at 384-86.
39 See Johnson & Post, supra note 9. See also Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199 (1998) (critiquing Johnson and Post's position
on Internet regulation).
40 David R. Johnson and Professor David Post, at the time their article was
published, were co-directors of the Cyberspace Law Institute. Professor Post currently
teaches at Temple University Law School.
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recognizable geographical boundaries.41  In other words, the
Internet is supposedly immune from all regulations enacted by
individual nation-states because it does not reside in any one
locality and is not the property of any one nation.42 However, this
view that the Internet is somehow beyond national regulation
ignores the realities of cyberspace.43 While it is true that the
transnational nature of the Internet may make jurisdictional issues
more complicated, the Internet, like other means of mass
communications, can be regulated. 4  After all, the Internet is
nothing more than a network of computers that are accessed by
real people sitting in front of their monitors which are physically
located within the borders of some nation. Moreover, the
information communicated over the Internet can cause real harm
to governments or individuals within countries.45  Internet
pornography and hate speech can degrade, humiliate, and incite.46
Given that the Internet is populated by real people causing real
harm, there is no reason to believe that the Internet is beyond the
jurisdictional scope of national regulation.47
b) Territorial Principle of Jurisdiction
Even if one believes that the Internet can and should be
regulated, the Internet's open and decentralized framework does
pose some difficult jurisdictional entanglements.48 Concepts of
41 Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1370-71.
42 See id.
43 Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 1250 (arguing that cyberspace transactions are no
different from "real-space" transnational transactions).
44 id. at 1239-40.
45 See Mody, supra note 10, at 367-68 (discussing Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of
the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1119, 1121 (1998)).
46 For an in-depth discussion of the dangers of pornography and hate speech, see
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATT'Y GEN. COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT (1986);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Vindication and Resistance: A Response to the Carnegie
Mellon Study of Pornography in Cyberspace, 83 GEO. L.J. 1959 (1995); Mar J.
Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Diana.E. H. Russell, Pornography and
Rape: A Causal Model, 9 POL. PSYCHOL. 41 (1988); Evelyn K. Sommers & James V.P.
Check, An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Pornography in the Verbal and
Physical Abuse of Women, 2 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 189 (1987):
47 Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 1200.
48 See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 9.
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jurisdiction embody notions of equity.49 An individual should not
be hauled into court unless she has, in some manner, committed an
affirmative act that gives the forum state the right to exert
jurisdiction. ° Likewise, there is an equitable argument that a
website or an ISP in compliance with the laws of the nation where
they are physically present should not be subjected to the laws of
another nation. "[T]he Internet's architecture does not enable a
content provider... to select where precisely its information will
flow." Cyberspace transmissions are indifferent to national
boundaries.5 2 Furthermore, current software technology designed
to block certain users from accessing particular sites is
unimpressive. The experts empanelled by the French court in the
Yahoo! case "estimated that 70% of the IP addresses assigned to
French surfers can be matched with certainty to a service provider
located in France, and therefore can be filtered" by blocking
software. 3 This means that 30% of IP addresses cannot be filtered
by existing software programs.
Despite these equitable and technological difficulties, many
Internet legal scholars such as Jack L. Goldsmith54 would argue at
the very minimum that a nation has the right to regulate those
cyberspace transmissions that occur within its borders." The right
of a nation to exert jurisdiction over its internal affairs is embodied
in the universally accepted tenet known as the territorial principle
of jurisdiction. 6 According to the territorial principle of
jurisdiction, since a state, is sovereign within its own borders, it
can exert jurisdiction over individuals or entities located on its
territory.57 Therefore, an ISP that conducts business within the
forum state and whose servers are physically present in the forum
state is subject to the laws of that state and can be tried in its
courts.58 The corollary to the territorial principle is that "a state's
49 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
50 Id.
51 Mody, supra note 10, at 369.
52 Id.
53 Akdeniz, supra note 29, 9.
54 Professor Jack L. Goldsmith is a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.
55 See Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 1207-08.
56 See Mody, supra note 10, at 371.
57 See id. at 304.
58 Mody, supra note 10, at 371-72.
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legal authority to regulate conduct on its own territory precludes it,
by definition, from regulating conduct taking place outside its
territory."59
c) Objective Territorial Principle of Jurisdiction
Nations seeking to exert jurisdiction beyond their borders are
not bound by jurisdictional limitations inherent in the territorial
principle of jurisdiction because international law, since 1927, has
recognized the right of a nation, in certain circumstances, to exert
jurisdiction over actions that originate abroad but whose effects
are felt within the forum nation.6" The right of a nation to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over an individual or entity whose
actions cause local harm is known as the objective territorial
principle.61
The objective territorial principle was first introduced as a
theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) in The Case of the S.S. "Lotus. ,62 The
"Lotus" case involved a collision on the high seas between a
French steamer and a Turkish vessel in which the latter sank and
Turkish sailors and passengers lost their lives.63 After the French
steamer was forced to dock in a Turkish port, the ship's officers
were tried and convicted of involuntary manslaughter.' "[T]he
Court held that the state of Turkey could apply its criminal laws to
any foreigner who committed an offense abroad to the prejudice of
Turkey or a Turkish subject, provided the foreigner was arrested
within Turkish territory., 65  The Court stated that there was no
absolute prohibition against a nation from exercising the
jurisdiction of its courts to persons, property and acts outside its
territory, and that international law gave nations discretion in
certain limited instances to adopt the most suitable jurisdictional
59 Id. at 372. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
303, 289-94 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing principles of sovereignty).
60 See S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927).
61 BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 304.
62 S.S. "Lotus."
63 Id. at 10.
64 Id. at 13.
65 Mody, supra note 10, at 374 (discussing S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927
P.C.1.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 13 (1927)).
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principle.66 More importantly, the PCIJ explicitly recognized the
objective territorial principle when it stated that:
[I]t is certain that the courts of many countries, even of countries
which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial
character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offences, the
authors of which at the moment of commission are in the
territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as
having been committed in the national territory, if one of the
constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its
effects, have taken place there.67
In the aftermath of the "Lotus" case, American courts began
recognizing the objective territorial principle as a basis for
exerting jurisdiction in antitrust cases. The United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am. 68  (ALCOA) "considered whether the United States
government could apply the Sherman Act69 antitrust provisions to
a Canadian company whose conduct, though wholly
extraterritorial, had anticompetitive effects within the United
States."7 The court held that even though a state could not assert
jurisdiction over an activity having no relationship with the forum
state, it could exert jurisdiction over activities that originated
abroad but whose effects were felt within the forum state.7
Within the last decade, the United States Supreme Court, in
Hartford Fire Insurance Company Co. v.. California, held that the
Sherman Act 71 extended to alleged antitrust activity on the part of
a reinsurance company that occurred within the territory of Great
Britain.73 Despite the fact that the reinsurance company's conduct
complied with British law, the Supreme Court found that the
United States was well within its rights under international law to
66 Id. (discussing S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19
(1927)).
67 S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23 (1927).
68 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
69 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
70 Mody, supra note 10, at 376 (discussing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)).
71 Id. (discussing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d. 416, 443 (2d
Cir. 1945)).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
73 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-99 (1993).
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regulate activity that "produced substantial effect[s]" within its
territory.74
Courts outside the United States have also adopted the
objective territorial principle. The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) in 4hlstrdm Osakeyhitd & Others v. Commission (Wood
Pulp Case) had to decide the extraterritorial reach of the European
Community's (EC) anti-competition law.75 The ECJ decided that
the defendants, Swedish and Finnish wood pulp producers and
their trade associations, fell within the jurisdiction scope of the
European Community's anticompetition rules despite the fact that
these entities had no offices or facilities located within the
Community.76 The ECJ held that the defendants had violated the
Community's anticompetitive rules by engaging in a price fixing
scheme.77 The ECJ considered it immaterial for jurisdictional
purposes whether the defendants had any substantial contacts with
producers within the EC through the defendant's agents or
subsidiaries.78 All that mattered for the ECJ was that these wood
pulp producers and their trade associations had committed acts,
although originating outside the EC, whose effects were felt within
the European Community.79
Outside of the United States and the European Community,
other jurisdictions have accepted the objective territorial principle
as a legitimate basis for jurisdiction in antitrust cases.80  The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, section 403,81 notes that most states in Western Europe,
including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as Canada and Japan,
have accepted the objective territorial principle as a basis for
74 Mody, supra note 10, at 376 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 796 (1993))'.
75 Case 89/85, Ahlstrrm Osakeyhitb & Others v. Commission (Wood Pulp Case),
1988 E.C.R. 5193 (1988).
76 Id. at 5240-247.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Mody, supra note 10, at 378.
81 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403, no. 3
(1987)
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extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases. 82
Still, if the objective territorial principle as a basis for
extraterritorial jurisdiction were recognized only in the context of
antitrust litigation, then it would be of doubtful utility as a means
of legitimizing the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
freedom of expression cases. With regard to the Internet, one
could apply the objective territorial principle, given its wide
acceptance in antitrust matters, to regulate Internet commerce
involving instances where a nation's or a community's
anticompetitive rules are being violated. However, there have
been several cases where the objective territorial principle has
been recognized outside of the sphere of antitrust litigation. The
first case worth mentioning, SS. "Lotus," discussed previously,83
involved a criminal prosecution of an admiralty matter.84 Another
seminal case, the Trail Smelter Case,85 involved a dispute between
the United States and Canada over the emissions from an iron ore
smelter located only seven miles from the United States border in
Trail, British Columbia.86 The United States alleged that the sulfur
dioxide emissions from the Canadian smelter had caused crop
damage in the State of Washington.87 The Tribunal found that
under principles of international law that "no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory ... to cause injury by fumes in
or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence."88
From the holding in the Trail Smelter Case, one can analogize
that no state has the right, under international law, to permit its
territory to pollute the minds and souls of another nation's
citizens.89 Instead of environmental pollution, as in the Trail
82 Mody, supra note 10, at 378 (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, no. 3 (1987)).
83 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
84 S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927).
85 Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1935).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1907.
88 Id. at 1965 (The tribunal in this case was formed by joint cooperation of the
governments of the United States and Canada).
89 See id.
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Smelter Case,9 ° what one has in cases of Internet pornography and
hate speech is cultural pollution.9 Granted that environmental
pollution is much more easily measured and verified than cultural
pollution, however, there is a considerable amount of research
from legal scholars and social scientists to support the idea that
hate speech and pornography cause real societal and cultural harm,
despite the absence of exactitude that one supposedly finds in the
"hard" physical sciences.
92
Support for the idea that the objective territorial principle is
appropriate in cases of cultural pollution can be found where the
objective territorial principle was invoked to legitimize the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in narcotics smuggling
cases. For instance, a United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida in United States v. Noriega invoked
the objective territorial principle as the court's basis for asserting
jurisdiction over the Panamian dictator, Manuel Noriega, on
charges that he allegedly provided a safe haven for international
narcotics traffickers who used Panama as a base to manufacture
and ship cocaine into the United States.93 Noriega tried to argue
that the court had no jurisdiction over him because the alleged acts
occurred outside of United States territory.94 However, the District
Court noted that "[a]ll the nations of the world recognize 'the
principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in
motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where
the evil is done."' 95 For example, the court stated "the United
States would unquestionably have authority to prosecute a person
standing in Canada who fires a bullet across the border which
strikes a second person standing in the United States."96
90 Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1935).
91 Cultural pollution refers to ways that the communication of words and images
can degrade and harm the cultural environment in which we live. John Copeland Nagle,
Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, YALE L.J. 293, 327-28 (2000) (reviewing
ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND
WHY (Overlook Press, 2000)).
92 See sources cited supra note 44.
93 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (1990), aff'd 117 F.3d 1206
( lIth Cir. 1997).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1513 (quoting Rivard v. United States, 375 F. 2d. 882, 887 (5th Cir.)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967)).
96 Id. at 1512-13.
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Moreover, the District Court noted that "international law
principles have expanded to permit jurisdiction upon a mere
showing of intent to produce effects in this country, without
requiring proof of an overt act or effect within the United
States. 97 Therefore, the court in this case found plenty of support
in international law for its assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.9"
In assessing whether extraterritorial jurisdiction can be
exercised in a freedom of expression case, the above cases are
useful in illuminating the basic principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction; however, they do not explain the rationale behind
these principles. In Principles of Public International Law, Ian
Brownlie attempts to bring some coherence to the field of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.99 Brownlie states that extraterritorial
acts can only be the object of jurisdiction if specific principles are
followed:
(i) that there should be a substantial and bona fide connection
between the subject-matter and the source of the jurisdiction;
(ii) that the principle of non-intervention in the domestic or
territorial jurisdiction of other states should be observed;
(iii) that a principle based on elements of accommodation,
mutuality, and proportionality should be applied. Thus nationals
residing abroad should not be constrained to violate the law of
the place of residence.' 00
Brownlie's three general principles embody the notion that the test
as to whether the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
legitimate is one of reasonableness.'0 '
Michael Geist,' °2 in his article on Internet jurisdiction, noted that
in American courts the reasonableness standard is in terms of
"minimum contacts,"'0 3 while in Canada the courts speak of a
97 Id. at 1513.
98 Id.
99 BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 312-13. Professor Ian Brownlie is a professor of
international law at the' University of Oxford and a member of the International Law
Commission.
100 Id. at 313.
101 See id.
102 Professor Michael Geist is a law professor at the University of Ottawa Law
School specializing in Internet and electronic commerce law.
103 Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
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"real and substantial connection."' °4 According to Geist, at the
crux of the term "reasonableness" within the context of
jurisdiction law is the notion of foreseeability, "which dictates that
a party should only be hauled into a. foreign court where it was
foreseeable that such an eventuality might occur."' 5
The traditional view of what constitutes reasonableness/
foreseeability is highlighted by an Illinois federal court's holding
in, Euromarket Designs Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd.'06 In that case,
the court had. to decide whether an Illinois-based company could
sue an Irish retailer in a local court for trademark infringement.0 7
From the retailer's interactive .Web site, Illinois residents could
order goods and have them shipped to Illinois addresses.0 8 The
court noted that the crux of the case was whether the corporate
defendant had purposefully and deliberately availed itself of the
forum and whether the defendant's conduct rose to the level that
the defendant should have been reasonably aware of the possibility
that it might be forced to appear in front of a court in the forum
state. 10 9 The court concluded that, the defendant had established
sufficient minimum contacts to establish the court's jurisdiction
under the objective territorial principle because (1) the injury
would be felt primarily in Illinois, (2) the defendant intentionally
and purposefully directed its actions towards Illinois and the
plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, and (3) the defendant knew that
the harm would likely be suffered in Illinois." 0
d) Targeting-Based Analysis
There is something unsatisfactory about the reasonableness/
foreseeability standard of the objective territorial principle in cases
where the website or Internet Service Provider is a passive actor.
Jurisdiction, FIFTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE, 561, 572 (2001) (quoting Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
104 Id. at 572 (quoting Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. DeSavoye, 3 S.C.R. 1077 (1990)).
105 Id. at 572-73.
106 Id. at 591 (discussing Euromarket Designs Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F.
Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. 111. 2000)).
107 Euromarket Designs Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828 (N.D.
Il1. 2000).
108 Id. at 829.
109 Id. at 834-35.
110 Id.
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With worldwide Internet availability, foreseeability is much more
difficult to gauge because content and service providers have
limited ability to control who accesses what particular types of
information without being overly broad in their restrictions.11 As
Geist notes, where the application of the objective territorial
principle "raises few concerns when it involves activity such as
securities fraud where global rules are relatively uniform, the
application of an effects-based [objective territorial principle]
standard to issues such as free speech is likely to prove highly
contentious."1"2 Geist notes that a local court may assert
jurisdiction even in the absence of evidence that the harm was
directed at the jurisdiction, if the local harm was too great for the
court to ignore.'
1 3
In response to these shortcomings, Geist suggests that the
objective territorial principle should be refined to include the
concept of targeting. 14 A targeting-based analysis would lessen a
court's sole reliance on the objective territorial principle by
seeking to identify the intentions of the parties and to assess the
steps taken to either enter or avoid a particular jurisdiction.'15
American courts have recently begun to factor targeting
considerations into their analysis of whether they can assert
jurisdiction over Internet activity."6 For example, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.
Augusta Nat'l Inc.,1 7 a dispute over the masters.com domain
name, the relationship between the objective territorial principle
and a targeting based analysis ofjurisdiction." 8 The court noted:
To meet the effects test [objective territorial principle], the
defendant must have (1) committed an intentional act, which
was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm,
the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is
likely to be suffered in the forum state. Subsequent cases have
struggled somewhat with Calder's import, recognizing that the
III Geist, supra note 103, at 591-93.
112 Id. at 575.
113 Id. (referring to the Yahoo! Inc. case).
114 See id. at 598.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).
118 Id See also Geist, supra note 103, at 598.
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case cannot stand for the broad proposition that a foreign act
with foreseeable effects in the forum state always gives rise to
specific jurisdiction. We have said that there must be
"something more," but have not spelled out what that something
more must be." 19
The court went on further to conclude, "'something more' is
what the Supreme Court described as 'express aiming' at the
forum state."'12' Although the Ninth Circuit noted that express
aiming is a concept that hardly defines itself, it deduced that "the
requirement is satisfied when the defendant is alleged to have
engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the
defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state."''
The targeting-based analysis has also been used by American
courts in cases involving online gambling where offshore Internet
sites were characterized as targeting local residents. 2 2 In People
v. World Interactive Gaming, a New York state court considered
the targeting implications of online gambling and stated that
"[w]ide range implications would arise if this Court adopted
respondents' argument that activities or transactions which may be
targeted at New York residents are beyond the state's
jurisdiction." 12' The court went on further to state that "[n]ot only
would such an approach severely undermine this state's deep-
rooted policy against unauthorized gambling, it also would
immunize from liability anyone who engages in any activity over
the Internet which is otherwise illegal in this state."'' 2 4 Finally, the
court declared, "[a] computer server cannot be permitted to
function as a shield against liability, particularly in this case where
respondents actively targeted New York as the location where they
conducted many of their allegedly illegal activities.' 25
Targeting provisions have also been assimilated into a recent
119 Bancroft & Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1087 (citations omitted) (referring to
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), the first case where the United States Supreme
Court recognized the effects doctrine, alternatively known as the "objective territorial
principle").
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Geist, supra note 103, at 599.
123 People v. World Interactive Gaming, 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850 (1999).
124 Id.
125 Id.
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draft of the Hague Conference on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments. 126 In the course of negotiations, delegates focused on
targeting as an appropriate litmus test for when Internet consumers
should be entitled to sue in their home jurisdiction. 127 The
American Bar Association (ABA) Internet Jurisdiction Project
also considered a targeting approach in its report released in
2000. 128 The Internet study noted that:
Today, entities seeking a relationship with residents of a foreign
forum need not maintain a physical presence in the forum. A
forum can be "targeted" by those outside it and desirous of
benefiting from a connection with it via the Internet. Such a
chosen relationship will subject the foreign actor to both
personal and prescriptive jurisdiction, so a clear understanding
of what constitutes targeting is critical. 1
29
According to Geist, the litmus test as to what constitutes
targeting is the "core jurisdictional principle-foreseeablity."' 3 In
this test, foreseeability is not based on whether the content or
service provider takes an active or passive role in disseminating
Internet content like hate speech and pornography, but is based on
three factors none of which by themselves are determinative:
contracts, technology and actual or implied knowledge.' 3
Contracts are important in assessing the reasonableness/
foreseeability of extraterritorial jurisdiction because contracts in
the form of licensing and user agreement specifying a choice of
forum or choice of law can help limit the content and/or service
provider's exposure to being forced to defend itself in far-flung
jurisdictions.'32 North American courts have been willing to
enforce the terms of an online contract, commonly referred to as a
126 Geist, supra note 103, at 599 (citing Hague Conference on Private International
Law: Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (October 1999), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/draft36e.html) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
127 Id.
128 A.B.A. Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project, Achieving Legal and Business Order
in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created By the Internet, 55 Bus.
LAW. 1801 (2000).
129 Id. at 1827-28.
130 Geist, supra note 103, at 602.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 603.
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clickwrap agreement,"' especially when the terms of the online
contract are reasonable and the user has assented to the contract."3Progressively, technology plays a more important role in
assessing reasonableness/foreseeability because of the
development of increasingly sophisticated software designed to
limit a business' exposure to legal risk by blocking access to users
in cases where such access would be illegal.' Of course, there is
the problem that existing blocking software is not 100% effective.
As noted earlier, a group of experts empanelled by the French
court in the Yahoo! case estimated that existing technology could
only filter about 70% of French Internet Protocol (IP) addesses 36
The panel noted that "this finding was not without numerous
exceptions as a large number of these, in the order of 20%, stem
from the multinational character of the access provider or from the
fact that they use the services of an international ISP or a private
communication network." 137
However, in many instances, the ISP or content provider does
not need to install perfect blocking software, just software
reasonably calculated to block illegal access, to reap the benefits
under a targeting analysis test.1 38 If a content or service provider
has employed contractual agreements and the best available
blocking software to limit its legal risk, then the violation may
have to be of great import in order to render the foreign court's
assertion of jurisdiction reasonable. A good faith attempt by the
content or service provider to comply with the laws of a foreign
state serves to negate the reasonableness of an assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction for any violation except one of great
importance.
The final factor in a targeting-based analysis is actual or
133 Id. at 604.
134 Id. In a Canadian case, an Ontario court stated that a forum selection clause in a
clickwrap agreement was not analogous to fine print in a written contract and that neither
the form of the contract nor its terms were unconscionable. Rudder v. Microsoft Corp.
(1999), 2 C.P.R. (4th) 474 (Ont. S.C.J.). In the United States, a court upheld a forum
selection clause found in a clickwrap contract. Kilgallen v. Network Solutions, Inc., 99
F. Supp. 2d 125, 128-30 (D. Mass. 2000).
135 Geist, supra note 103, at 610.
136 Akdeniz, supra note 29, 9.
137 Id.
138 Geist, supra note 103, at 611.
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implied knowledge.'39 In assessing reasonableness/foreseeablity,
this factor seeks to ensure that content and service providers
cannot avoid extraterritorial jurisdiction by "hid[ing] behind
contracts and/or technology by claiming a lack of targeting
knowledge when the evidence suggests otherwise.""14  An
unwillingness to dismiss willful blindness was evident in the
Supreme Court of New York's finding in People v. World
Interactive Gaming.4' The respondent, an offshore online gaming
casino, claimed that it was able to limit access to its Internet site to
users in places where online gambling was legal by requiring
Internet users to enter their home address.1 42 If the Internet user
entered an address where online gambling was not legal, then
access would be denied; but of course, as the court noted in its
decision, there was nothing to prevent an Internet user from
entering a false address. 143 The New York court found that the
respondent had persisted in activity in violation of state law
directed at New York residents by creating and maintaining a site
dedicated to unauthorized gambling.1 44  In essence, the
respondent's attempt to limit access was not reasonably calculated
to prevent unauthorized access, but merely a sham to avoid an
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 145
In applying a targeting-based analysis, which is essentially a
more refined version of the objective territorial principle, to the
principal cases involving the Internet and free expression, it seems
that there should be a jurisdictional demarcation between
commercial Internet providers who have foreign subsidies and
individual websites. As noted in a recent article, many
commentators, including an American Bar Association panel,
believe that extraterritorial jurisdiction is best viewed "using a
sliding scale focusing on the degree to which an alien purposely
invokes the benefits and protections of the forum ...... 146 The
ABA panel stated that:
139 Id. at 620.
140 Id.
141 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (1999).
142 Id. at 847.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 851.
145 Id.
146 Bratt & Kugele, supra note 19, at 46.
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[a]t one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant
clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end
are situations where a defendant has simply posted information
on an Internet website which is accessible to users in foreign
jurisdictions.1 47
In the middle area, such as interactive websites involving the
exchange of information between the user and host computer,
proper jurisdiction would be determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the website.448 In the case of Licra et
Uejf v. Yahoo!, 14 9 the sliding scale of reasonableness favors the
French court assertion of jurisdiction over Yahoo! Inc. 50 After all,
Yahoo! Inc. chose to have some contact with France when it
established its subsidiary, Yahoo France, to better serve French
Internet users.15' Furthermore, under the targeting-based analysis,
the French court was justified in asserting jurisdiction over Yahoo!
Inc. 15
2
In examining the contract prong of Geist's test,'53 Yahoo! Inc.
did attempt to argue that its liability was limited by "its charter
that warns all surfers against using the service for purposes worthy
of reprobation for whatsoever motive (incitement to hatred, racial
or ethnic discrimination... ).5. Moreover, Yahoo! Inc. utilized
a terms and condition page containing a choice of law clause
stating that American law governs; however, in all of these
contractual relationships there was a missing element - the consent
147 A.B.A. Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project, supra note 128, at 1851 (quoting
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
148 Bratt & Kugele, supra note 19, at 46. (citing A.B.A. Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Project at 1851, which in turn cites Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com., Inc. 952 F. Supp
1119 (W.D. Pa 1997)).
149 Akdeniz, supra note 29.
150 But see Bratt & Kugele, supra note 19, at 46 (asserting that a French court
should defer to a United States court because of the strong public policy in the United
States protecting speech).
151 Akdeniz, supra note 29.
152 See Geist, supra note 103, at 623.
153 Id. at 603.
154 Akdeniz, supra note 29.
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of the user.'
With regard to the technology prong,'56 there was no merit in
Yahoo! Inc.'s argument that it was technologically impossible to
identify surfers who visit its auction site.'57 As mentioned
previously, a group of Internet experts found that blocking
software could block about 70% of French Internet users from
accessing Yahoo! Inc.'s auction site.'58 Also, given the fact that
Yahoo! Inc. operates a French subsidiary, Yahoo France, Yahoo!
Inc. most likely knew that French residents were accessing its
auction sites. Therefore, on the sliding scale of reasonableness,
the French court's jurisdiction was proper in the Yahoo! case given
the fact that Yahoo! Inc. only attempted to minimize its legal risks
through a choice of forum clause, which did not require the user to
give his consent before entering, while ignoring available
technical solutions.'59
However, in the case involving the prosecution of
CompuServe USA, CompuServe Deutschland and its managing
director, Mr. Felix Somm, (the Somm case) 6 ° the sliding scale of
reasonableness does not help answer the question whether the
assertion of exterritorial jurisdiction was legitimate. As previously
stated, German authorities charged CompuServe USA, its German
subsidiary, and the subsidiary's managing director of violating
Germany's penal code by making accessible to the public
"pornographic writings containing acts of violence, sexual abuse
of children and sex acts between human beings and animals."''
The defendants were also charged with making available to the
public three violent computer games banned under German law.'62
The Somm case differs in significant ways from the Yahoo!
case. First, while Yahoo! Inc. hosts a website that produces and
155 Geist, supra note 103, at 623.
156 Id. at 610.
157 Akdeniz, supra note 29.
158 Id. 9.
159 Geist, supra note 103, at 623.
160 Judgment of the Local court Munich in the Criminal Case versus Somm, Felix
Bruno (1998), translated at www.cyber-rights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm, IV. 1 (last visited
Sept. 4, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
161 Id.
162 See id. at IV.2.
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disseminates its own content, 163 CompuServe is an Internet Service
Provider whose business is not to produce content but merely to
enable Internet users to access sites on the world wide web. 164 As
Somm noted in his defense, the illegal content was not created or
distributed by him or his corporate employer, but by third parties
whose actions over which he had no control.'65 Furthermore,
Somm asserted that these illegal images and data in many
instances were not stored on CompuServe's servers, but on third
party servers accessible via the Internet. 166 Whereas Yahoo! Inc.'s
violation of French law was limited to its auction sites, 167 the
German court demanded that CompuServe and Felix Somm patrol
numerous newsgroups whose content was controlled, not by
CompuServe, but the Internet users themselves. 
168
Additional differences between the two cases are highlighted
especially in regards to the technology prong of the targeting
based analysis. Unlike the Yahoo! case, where reasonably
effective blocking software existed,'69 there was no such blocking
software available in 1997 to CompuServe. 170 Furthermore,
CompuServe's blocking software would have had to monitor
access not just to one site located on its server, as in the case of
Yahoo!, but to a multitude of newsgroups that resided on third
party servers. 1
71
.Nevertheless, CompuServe and Somm did, in good faith,
attempt to comply with German law first by blocking everyone's
access to the newsgroups. 172  However, this all-or-nothing
approach was commercially unviable because CompuServe's users
in America and elsewhere were threatening to take their business
163 Akdeniz, supra note 29.
164 Judgment of the Local court Munich in the Criminal Case versus Somm, Felix
Bruno, at IV. 1.
165 See id
166 Id.
167 Akdeniz, supra note 29.
168 See Judgment of the Local court Munich in the Criminal Case versus Somm,
Felix Bruno, at IV.2.A.5, V.A.
169 See Akdeniz, supra note 29,
170 See Konkel, supra note 20, at 459-60.
171 See Judgment of the Local court Munich in the Criminal Case versus Somm,
Felix Bruno, at V.A.
172 id. at 11.1.
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to other ISPs if CompuServe did not restore access to what was
legal material in their jurisdiction.'73 As a compromise intended to
placate both German authorities and its non-German customers,
CompuServe, in the absence of server-based blocking software,
offered its German customers individual blocking software
designed to block their own as well as their children's access to
the illegal content. 74 In contrast to Yahoo! Inc. which did not
even attempt to limit access to its offending auction website,1
71
CompuServe made a reasonable attempt to comply with German
law. In light of this reasonable attempt, the German court's
assertion of jurisdiction over CompuServe and its subsidiary was
unreasonable. 176  Although CompuServe did have actual
knowledge that its German customers were accessing illegal
content using CompuServe as a conduit, the element of intent is
missing in the Somm case as opposed to People v. Worldwide
Gaming,177 which involved an offshore online casino claiming it
unknowingly allowed New York residents to gamble on its site.
78
Whereas the online casino was hiding behind its sham verification
procedures as means to avoid being hauled into a foreign court
while at the same time facilitating illegal gambling, 7
9
CompuServe was acting in good faith in trying to find an
acceptable solution to its quandary. 8 '
Evidence supporting the assertion that the German court's
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was illegitimate in the
Somm case can be derived from the fact that the German
legislature in the midst of the Somm/CompuServe prosecution
passed an amendment to the Information and Communications
Services Act (ICSA)"8' "designed to shield service providers like
173 See Konkel, supra note 20, at 459 (citing Hans-Werner Moritz, Pornography
Prosecution in Germany Rattles ISPs, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at B7).
174 Id. at 459-61.
175 Akdeniz, supra note 29.
176 See Judgment of the Local court Munich in the Criminal Case versus Somm,
Felix Bruno, at V.A.
177 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1999).
178 Id. at 851.
179 See id. at 847, 851.
180 See Judgment of the Local court Munich in the Criminal Case versus Somm,
Felix Bruno, at V.A.
181 Informations-und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz - IuKDG (Teledienstegesetz
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CompuServe and corporate officers like Somm from criminal or
civil liability for the act taken independently by their users."
'1 82
The ICSA, however, in accordance with a targeting-based
analysis, "subjects online providers to criminal prosecution for
acting as a conduit for illegal content if they do so knowingly and
it is technically possible and reasonable to prevent [the illegal
content's dissemination]." '183
Finally, along the sliding scale of reasonableness, one
encounters situations where a court attempts to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant who has simply
posted information on an accessible Internet website in violation
of the prosecuting state's laws.184 In these types of cases, a
targeting-based analysis should not be applied because it is very
doubtful that an individual, as opposed to a corporation, will have
the necessary expertise and resources to be able to limit risk of
liability through contract and technology. Rather, the
reasonableness of a court's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over individuals can best be judged according to the general tenets
of the objective territorial principle. And under the objective
territorial principle, a court cannot assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over a foreign national simply on the basis that the
foreign national's website contains images or data that violate the
forum state's laws and that are accessible to users within the
forum state. 8' The reasonableness of asserting extraterritorial
jurisdiction depends in large part on whether there is a substantial
and bona fide connection between the subject matter and the
source of the jurisdiction and whether the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction offends notions of accommodation and
mutuality as well as nonintervention.186
Where individuals and free expression are involved, it is
unlikely that extraterritorial jurisdiction will be reasonable given
the lack of contacts between the foreign national and the forum,
[TDG]) art. 1, § 5(1) (1997) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.iid.de/iukdg/gesetz/
iukdge.html.
182 Konkel, supra note 20, at 463 (citing Kenneth Cukier, PSINet Sends Warning
Signals to German State, COMMUNICATIONS WEEK INT'L, July 20, 1998, at 16).
183 Rappaport, supra note 27, at 793.
184 See Razavi & Samman, supra note 33, at 28.
185 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 313.
186 Id. at 312-13.
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the nature of the rights involved, and the intrusiveness inherent
when one nation attempts to exert jurisdiction over another
nation's citizen. For example, the German judge who issued an
arrest warrant for Frederick Toben, an Australian citizen, for
posting his Holocaust revisionist opinions on his Australian-based
website acted unreasonably under the objective territorial
principle.'87 Toben, aside from the fact that he was born in
Germany, had only a very tenuous connection with the forum
state. 188  Moreover, in Toben's case, the issue did not involve
commercial gain or loss, but the highly revered right under
international law to freely express one's opinion.189 Finally, the
German judge's arrest warrant was an unreasonable assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction because it was overly intrusive in that
the German court failed to consider the fact that such an exercise
would impinge on Australia's sovereign authority over its own
citizens.90
In assessing the legitimacy of extraterritorial jurisdiction over
Internet content under the objective territorial principle, it appears
that international law does recognize the right of states to regulate
Internet content provided that the jurisdiction is reasonable. 19' As
long as there is a substantial and bona fide connection between the
subject matter and the source of the jurisdiction, and the principles
of accommodation, mutuality, and nonintervention are observed,
international law will recognize the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction as being legitimate.'92 From the various cases
examined, one can confidently assert that the objective territorial
principle is widely accepted, as one would expect, in the realm of
commercial transactions where only a pecuniary gain or loss is
involved. Certainly, commercial transactions over the web would
fall into this category rendering extraterritorial jurisdiction
reasonable. Commercial e-retailers expect to enjoy the benefits
and privileges provided by the forum state, especially with the
187 See Razavi & Samman , supra note 33, at 28-29 (discussing the Dec. 12, 2000
decision of Germany's highest court, the Bundesgerichthof, regarding Frederick Toben).
188 See id.
189 Id. at 28.
190 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 313.
191 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403
and Comment (a) (1987).
192 Id.
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enforcement of contracts entered into by a resident of the forum
state. In freedom of expression cases, however, the
reasonableness of extraterritorial jurisdiction is more problematic.
What is reasonable in an Internet freedom of expression case
depends in large part on balancing the rights of two competing
jurisdictions. On the one hand, one needs to consider the severity
of the harm suffered and the right of a state to seek redress. On
the other hand, one has to consider how severely the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction impinges on another state's
sovereignty. The objective territorial principle would find the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction reasonable in the Yahoo!
case but not in the Somm and Toben cases. However, given the
fear that courts might focus on the fact that the local harm was felt
in the forum state to the exclusion of other considerations, a
targeting-based analysis where applicable is preferable, especially
in cases involving commercial websites and service providers who
can limit their risk through contract and technology.
e) Universality Principle of Jurisdiction
Aside from the objective territorial principle and its prodigy,
there is another viable basis for allowing extraterritorial
jurisdiction over Internet content and access; this additional basis
is known as the "universality principle."1 93 A considerable number
of states have adopted, usually with limitations, this principle.'94
The universality principle allows jurisdiction over non-nationals
where circumstances, including the nature of the crime, justify
state action as a matter of international public policy. 95 With
regards to the Internet, there is an international consensus as to the
evil posed by the sexual exploitation of children.'96 Every nation
has criminalized the sexual abuse of children, 9 7 and the vast
majority of states have, enacted legislation against child
pornography. 98
193 Id. at 307.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See Razavi & Samman, supra note 33, at 30.
197 Id.
198 William R. Graham, Jr., Uncovering and Eliminating Child Pornography Rings
on the Internet: Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Law Enforcement's Access to
'Wonderland', 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 457,471 (2000) (citing John T. Soma et. al.,
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Moreover, international conventions on the rights of children
favor the strict enforcement of such laws and lend support to the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in these types of cases.199
Over a ten-year period beginning in 1979, the United Nations
drafted the Convention of the Rights of the Child (Convention) 210
with the participation of over forty nations. 20 ' The Convention
was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on November
20, 1989, and entered into force on September 2, 1990.202
Currently, 187 nations have signed and ratified the Convention.2 3
The Convention requires all state parties to "take all appropriate
national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent ... [t]he
exploitative use of children in pornographic performance and
materials. 2 4 Also, in its Convention on Cybercrime, the Council
of Europe specifically singled out child pornography as being the
one content-related offense that demands a common criminal
policy among the states.20 5
This international consensus against the sexual abuse of
children allowed Italian courts to charge 1,491 people for child
pornography on the Internet and to begin dismantling the
infrastructure of a well-developed child pornography ring in
Russia.20 6 This consensus against child pornography also enabled
law enforcement authorities from the United States and thirteen
other countries to act decisively as a coordinated unit in
dismantling a multinational child pornography ring known as the
Wonderland Club.20 7
Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are New Treaties and Laws Needed?,
34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 317, 333 (1997)).
199 See Razavi & Samman, supra note 33, at 30.
200 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, 166, 167, 358, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter Child Convention].
201 Lesli C. Esposito, Regulating the Internet: The New Battle Against Child
Pornography, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541, 559 (1998) (citing Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, 166, 167, 358,
U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989)).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Child Convention, supra note 200, at 171.
205 Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, Council of Europe, art. 9, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HTM/185.htm.
206 Razavi & Samman, supra note 33, at 30.
207 Graham, Jr., supra note 198, at 458-59.
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The Wonderland Club was a U.S.-based child pornography
ring with more than 200 members scattered throughout at least
thirty-three different nations. 208 The investigation began with the
1996 arrest of two members of a child pornography ring in
California by U.S. Customs, who then alerted British authorities
that another member of this ring was living in England.29 Based
on this tip, British authorities arrested the individual and seized his
computer, finding evidence of the Wonderland Club.210 Given this
international consensus against child pornography as evidenced by
the Convention 21 and the Wonderland prosecution, nations under
the universality principle can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
in combating this crime.212
]) Crimes Under International Law
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over Internet content and access
may be exercised when the Internet is used as an instrument to
facilitate crimes under international law.213 According to Brownlie,
crimes under international law refer to breaches of the law of war,
otherwise known as war crimes and crimes against humanity.214
Brownlie argues that international treaty obligations criminalizing
violations of the law of war have empowered all states to punish
war criminals who happen to come into their custody, regardless
of nationality.215
Beginning with the end of World War II, the international
community started actively pursuing and punishing war
criminals.216 In response to the Holocaust, the United Nations
208 Id. at 462.
209 Id. at 463-64.
210 Id. at 464.
211 Child Convention, supra note 200.
212 Graham, Jr., supra note 198, at 478-79.
213 Crimes under international law as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction can be
easily confused with the universality principle. Although similar, the universality
principle is not based on any breach of international law; rather, its theoretical
underpinnings are based upon international law giving states permission to pursue
violations of their domestic laws beyond their respective states' boundaries. BROWNLIE,
supra note 59, at 308.
214 Id. (relying on the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of
1949).
215 Id.
216 Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to
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General Assembly adopted the Nuremberg Charter.217 In creating
an ad hoc international court at Nuremberg, Germany, the Charter
established the criminal responsibility of states and individuals
engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
against peace. 218  The United Nations unanimously adopted
Resolution 96(I) in 1946 declaring genocide a crime under
international law.219 Furthermore, Resolution 96(I) urged member
states to adopt a legally binding Convention on the matter.220
The efforts of the United Nations to draft such a Convention
culminated in the unanimous adoption in 1948 of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention) 21 by the General Assembly.222 The
Genocide Convention defines genocide as any "'acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious groups' regardless of whether such acts are
undertaken in peacetime or in wartime." '223 Parties to the Genocide
Convention recognize that anyone who commits or conspires to
commit genocide can be held criminally liable for his or her
acts. 224  "Furthermore, Article III of the. Genocide Convention
providesthat '[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide'
shall be punishable., 225 The Genocide Convention, which entered
into force in 1951, has been ratified or acceded to by over 100
nations.226
Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 91 (1992) (noting that it was not until the end of
World War 11 that the international community recognized genocide as a crime).
217 Id. (citing Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279).
218 ld. at 90.
219 U.N. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
220 Id.
221 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951), reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L.
7-10 (Supp. 1951).
222 Defeis, supra note 216 (citing Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951),
reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 7-10 (Supp. 1951)).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 92 (noting that the United States, despite being one of the original
signatories to the Genocide Convention, did not ratify it until 1986, in large part due to
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Within the last decade, there has been a growing international
consensus on the need to vigorously prosecute people who are
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.227 In 1993, the
United Nations Security Council established the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to prosecute those
responsible for international crimes in the former Yugoslavia. 28
In December 1995, the Security Council adopted Security Council
Resolution 103 1229 that authorized the use of force on the part of a
NATO-led contingent in arresting war criminals.230 Also, in 1994
the Security Council established an. ad hoc tribunal to prosecute
those individuals responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.23' In
July 1998, 120 nations approved the text of a treaty known as the
Rome Treaty232 that created a permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC) with responsibility of prosecuting individuals around
the globe who are accused of war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity.233 The Rome Treaty came into force in July
2002.234
Even though the Internet has not played a major role in
facilitating war crimes or crimes against humanity, the Rwandan
genocide of 1994, where the now-deposed Hutu government used
radio transmissions to incite and carry out the mass murder of
some 800,000 Tutsis, illustrates how a means of mass
free speech concerns involving Article III's prohibition against "incitement to commit
genocide").
227 See Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in
the New Millennium: Lessons From the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925,
927 (2000) (discussing institutional enforcement of international justice).
228 Id. at 927 (citing Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violation of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc.
S/25704/Annexes (1993)).
229 S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 3607th mtg., S/RES/1031 (1995).
230 Id. at 951-52.
231 Id. at 927.
232 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183.9
(1998).
233 Id. (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183.9 (1998)).
234 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://www.un.org/law/icc
(last updated Sept. 30, 2002).
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communication can be used for evil purposes.235 Despite an
inadequate information infrastructure, Hutu extremists were able
to use radio broadcasts, especially a semiprivate station to
organize roadblocks and to read lists of names of "enemies" who
were then tracked down and murdered by Hutu militias. 236 The
station's transmissions helped incite the mass murder of Tutsis by
calling them "cockroaches" and urging the militias to step up the
killing of civilians.237 In a similar vein, the Internet could be used
to incite genocide in violation of international law. Under
generally accepted jurisdictional principles; every nation would
have the right to assert jurisdiction over any individual in its
custody who was accused of using the Internet to incite war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. 38
Thus, various principles of jurisdiction recognized by
international law would allow a state to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign nations in cases involving crimes against
humanity, child pornography, or where the foreign national
specifically targets the forum state. However, not all Internet
content should be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction. There are
instances when the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction would
not be reasonable, such as in the case of a non-commercial website
espousing an individual's political opinion.
IV. International Guarantees of Freedom of Expression
Although an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction can be
justified by internationally recognized principles of jurisdiction,
other factors need to be considered. For transnational Internet
regulation to be a legitimate exercise of state power, it should
conform to international norms protecting free expression.
Even though the right to free expression had been embodied on
the national level by various laws and constitutions for centuries, it
was not until after World War II and the formation of the United
Nations that the right to freedom of expression found its voice in
the international arena.23 9 At its first session, the United Nations
235 Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio
Jamming, 91 A.J.I.L. 628, 629 (1997).
236 Id. at 631-32.
237 Id. at 633.
238 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 308.
239 See Defeis, supra note 216, at 75.
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General Assembly declared "[f]reedom of information is a
fundamental right and is the touchstone of all freedoms to which
the United Nations is consecrated; freedom of information requires
as an indispensable element the willingness and capacity to
employ its privileges without abuse."24  The first task of the
Human Rights Commission of the United Nations was drafting a
bill of rights designed to protect such basic human rights as the
freedom of expression.24" '
These efforts culminated in 1948 with the unanimous adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)2 42 by the
General Assembly that establishes "specific inalienable rights and
freedoms that cannot be abridged by any nation. 2 43 Although the
UDHR is not a treaty and thus technically is a non-binding source
of international law, there are legal scholars who will argue that
the UDHR, given its long history and wide acceptance, has
become customary international law "creating certain limited legal
obligations for member states. '44  In Article 19, the UDHR
specifically addresses the rights of individuals to freely express
their opinions.2 45 Article 19 states that "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers. 2 46  Given this language, the UDHR seems to prohibit
any governmental interference with an individual's right to impart
and receive information through the media, including the
Internet.2 47 Moreover, the phrase "regardless of frontiers"2 48 would
seem to prohibit any extraterritorial jurisdiction in freedom of
240 Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information, G.A. Res.
59(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1947), reprinted in 1 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS SER.
I. VOL. 1 82 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed. 1973).
241 Defeis, supra note 216, at 76.
242 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
243 Id. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
244 Konkel, supra note 20, at 472-473.
245 Universal Declaration, supra note 242, at art. 19.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
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expression cases. However, the UDHR does place some limits on
an individual's right to freely express his or her opinions. In
particular, Article 29 (2) of the UDHR states that:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in
a democratic society.
2 49
Therefore, an individual's right to free expression under the
UDHR is subordinate to a state's prerogative to exercise its police
powers in order to protect the morality, public safety, and general
welfare of its citizens.250
Following the adoption of the UDHR, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights began drafting several legally
binding covenants designed to implement the guarantees of the
UDHR. Among the first, adopted by the General Assembly in
1965, was the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Discrimination Convention). 5  With
regards to freedom of expression issues, Article 4 of the
Discrimination Convention addressed the dangers of racist
propaganda and speech. 2  Article 4 states:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or
group of persons of one color or ethnic origin, or which attempt
to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such
discrimination ... inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to
racial dissemination ....
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote
249 Id. at art. 29(2).
250 Konkel, supra note 20, at 472.
251 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter
Discrimination Convention]. See also Defeis, supra note 216, at 86.
252 Discrimination Convention, supra note 25 1, at art. 4.
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and incite racial discrimination...
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions,
national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.253
The Discrimination Convention requires that states not only
punish incitement, "but also the dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred. ' 254 Therefore, under the terms of the
Discrimination Convention, international law appears to require
that states monitor and regulate the Internet in order to prevent the
dissemination of racist ideas and arrest individuals guilty of
spreading such ideas.
However, many states expressed reservations over this language in
Article 4 because they feared that it compromised the right to free
expression. 5  In an effort to alleviate these concerns, Article 4
was modified to include a provision that any legislation designed
to implement the Discrimination Convention be enacted "'with
due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.' 256 In short, the far-reaching language of the
Discrimination Convention with regards to free expression is
constrained by Articles 19 and 29 of the UDHR. Therefore, the
Discrimination Convention places the same limits on free
expression as does the UDHR, which amounts to free expression
being limited in instances where a nation's morals, general
welfare, and public safety are threatened.257 Many states such as
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, when ratifying the
Discrimination Convention, made declarations to the effect that
they interpreted Article 4 as complying with the' UDHR's
guarantee of free expression.258 Furthermore, the Discrimination
Convention's utility as a source of international law is hampered
by the fact the United States has refused to act on this treaty.259
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Defeis, supra note 216, at 86.
256 Id. at 88.
257 See Universal Declaration, supra note 242, at art. 29(2).
258 Defeis, supra note 216, at 88 n. 153 (noting that Belgium, France, Italy, United
Kingdom, Malta, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga all made declarations that they would
interpret Article 4 in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights).
259 Id. at 90.
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Discrimination Convention allow states to curtail freedom of
speech in the name of broad and vague terms such as general
welfare, public safety, and morality. For example, the UDHR
establishes an international norm of free expression that is
constrained only in scope by a limitation designed to protect
general welfare, public safety, and morals.260  Also, the
Discrimination Convention's provision concerning free expression
is interpreted by many states in a manner that conforms to the
norm established by the UDHR.261  Regarding Internet
pornography and hate speech, there is a danger that a nation could
limit access to a wide array of scientific, cultural, and political
information in the name of protecting the general welfare, public
safety, and/or morals of its citizens. Thus, the UDHR and the
Discrimination Convention are not helpful because they fail to
provide any mechanism through which terms can be defined and
standards established. Therefore, to discover the limits
international law places on nations attempting to restrict freedom
of expression, one must look to the terms of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)26' and how they
have been interpreted by the ICCPR's adjudicatory branch, the
Human Rights Committee.263
The ICCPR is a legally binding treaty that embodies "the basic
minimum set of civil and political rights recognized by the world
community.' '264 The ICCPR is a universally recognized document,
having been signed by more than 100 nations upon its adoption by
the General Assembly in 1966.265 Also, there is an argument that
because of this wide international acceptance, at least some
provisions of the ICCPR "reflect norms of customary international
260 See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
261 Defeis, supra note 216, at 87-88.
262 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 31 (Paul Williams, ed., 1981) [hereinafter ICCPR].
263 U.N. Human Rights Committee, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/hrc.htm
(last visited Oct. 3, 2002).
264 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, T4- HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 20
(1994).
265 Id. As of September 1993, 122 nations including Brazil, South Korea, Iran,
Russia, United States, Germany, Kenya and India are State Parties to the Covenant. Id.
at xlv.
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law and are therefore binding on" non-party nations. 266 The status
of the ICCPR as a source of international law also has had an
impact on the domestic legal system of nations like Canada,
Germany, and India, where litigants have been able to "invoke the
ICCPR as directly applicable superior law or as persuasive
authority" in domestic constitutional cases.267
Regarding the right to free expression, there are two articles of
the ICCPR that are of particular importance. The first is Article
19 that states:
1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or
of public health or morals.
268
Basically, Article 19 codified the provisions in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights protecting the rights of individuals
to freely express their opinions.2 69 Like the UDHR, the ICCPR in
Article 19(3) has provisions allowing state parties to limit an
individual's right to free expression to protect the general welfare,
public safety, morals, and reputation of their respective citizens.270
The other article that impacts the right of free expression is
Article 20.271 Article 20 states that: (1) "[a]ny propaganda for war
shall be prohibited by law," and (2) "[a]ny advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
266 Id. at 21.
267 Id.
268 ICCPR, supra note 262, at art. 19.
269 See id.
270 See id
271 See id at art. 20.
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discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. 272
However, unlike the UDHR and the Discrimination
Convention, the ICCPR established in Article 28 a body named
the Human Rights Committee (HRC), designed to implement the
Covenant's provisions and adjudicate any disputes.273 The Human
Rights Committee is an important institution because it has
established through its adjudications international standards
governing how the ICCPR's provisions are to be applied in cases
dealing with pornography and hate speech.274
Responding to pornography, the leading Article 19 case
adjudicated by the HRC is Hertzberg and Others v. Finland.275 In
Hertzberg, the plaintiffs, authors, brought suit against Finnish
authorities, including the state controlled Finnish Broadcasting
Company (FBC), for violating their Article 19 right to freedom of
expression by censoring television and radio programs addressing
homosexuality.276 Finland argued that these television and radio
programs violated paragraph 9 of Chapter 20 of the Finnish Penal
Code, which states that "[a]nyone who publicly encourages
indecent behaviour between persons of the same sex shall be
sentenced for encouragement to indecent behaviour between
members of the same sex as decreed in subsection 1.,277 Finland
further argued that a majority of its citizens supported this criminal
code provision designed to protect the morals of Finnish
citizens.278 The HRC agreed that, in the case of the two programs
that were censored, the plaintiffs' rights to self-expression were
restricted, as defined by Article 19(2).279 Although the HRC noted
that in a majority of cases it would not find that an individual has a
right to express himself through television, a medium whose
available time is limited, the HRC noted that in cases where
programming has been produced for television broadcasting with
the initial approval of the responsible authorities - only to be later
272 See id.
273 See id. at art. 28.
274 McGOLDRICK, supra note 264, at 459-92.
275 Hertzberg and Others v. Finland, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 61/1979, at 124, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1982).
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 125.
279 Id at 126.
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censored - there might exist an Article 19(2) violation.280
However, the HRC noted that, in defense of these restrictions,
the Finnish Government had specifically invoked Article 19(3),
allowing a nation to censor content that threatened public
morals.2 1' The HRC held that the Finnish Government was within
its rights under Article 19(3) to censor the offending programs,
and thus, there was no violation under Article 19(2).282 In
explaining its holding, the HRC stated the following rationale:
It has to be noted, first, that public morals differ widely. There
is no universally applicable common standard. Consequently, in
this respect, a certain margin of discretion must be accorded to
the responsible national authorities.
The Committee [HRC] finds that it cannot question the
decisions of the responsible organs of the Finnish Broadcasting
Company that radio and TV are not appropriate forums to
discuss issues related to homosexuality, as far as a programme
could be judged as encouraging homosexual behaviour.
According to article 19(3), the exercise of the rights provided for
in article 19(2) carries with it special duties and responsibilities
for those organs. As far as radio and TV programmes are
concerned, the audience cannot be controlled. In particular,
harmful effects on minors cannot be excluded.283
Of particular importance, the HRC in Hertzberg .established a
"margin of discretion" standard.2 84 According to the HRC, when it
comes to pornography, national authorities are to be afforded a
certain margin of discretion in deciding whether to censor the
offending material. 285 Unfortunately, this "margin of discretion"
standard is not very helpful because the HRC in announcing its
decision did not provide any guidance as to how it planned to
apply this standard in future cases.286 While it is true that there is
"no universally applicable" common standard of morality,287 the
HRC's margin of discretion standard is so vague and deferential to
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
2002]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
national authority that a wide range of topics could be censored. If
the HRC censored radio and TV programs that merely
"encouraged" homosexuality (i.e. portrayed homosexuality in a
positive manner), then certainly the HRC would hold that a state
under Article 19 (3) could censor websites that discussed issues
relating to human sexuality and health that would not be
considered pornographic by Western standards.288
Regarding hate speech, the Human Rights Committee has
upheld a state's right to curtail racist speech. In MA. v. Italy, the
HRC held that Italian authorities did not violate speech and
association rights guaranteed by the ICCPR when they prosecuted
individuals attempting to reorganize the dissolved Fascist Party.289
The HRC stated that the reorganization of the Italian Fascist Party
was not the type of activity that the ICCPR was designed to
protect.29 °
The HRC went even further in J.R.T. and W.G. Party v.
Canada in upholding a state's right to curtail hate speech. 91 In
this case, the plaintiffs used tape-recorded messages linked to the
Bell Telephone system in Toronto to attract new members and
promote the Party's policies.292 The general public could call up
and listen to a message warning "'of the dangers of international
finance and international Jewry leading the world into wars,
unemployment and inflation and the collapse of world values and
principles.' ' 293  Canadian authorities responded by severely
curtailing the telephone service of the Party.294 The Party and Mr.
T. argued that these restrictions violated their right under Article
19(1) to hold and maintain opinions without interference and
violated their right under Article 19(2) to receive and impart ideas
of all kinds through the media of their choice.295 In response to
these allegations, Canadian authorities stated that their actions
288 See id.
289 M.A. v. Italy, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 117/1981, at
33, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1984).
290 Id.
291 J.R.T. and W.G. Party v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 104/1981, at 28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1984).
292 Id. at 25.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
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were in compliance with Article 20(2)'s prohibition of any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.296
After hearing both sides of the argument, the HRC ruled in
favor of the defendant, Canada.297 In its decision, the HRC stated
that "[t]he opinions which Mr. T seeks to disseminate through the
telephone system clearly constitute the advocacy of racial or
religious hatred which Canada has an obligation under Article
20(2) of the Covenant to prohibit., 298 Furthermore, the HRC
declared that "[i]n the Committee's opinion ... the
communication is, in respect of this claim, incompatible with the
provisions of the Covenant .... In short, the HRC held that
racist hate speech is not the type of communication that the
ICCPR was designed to protect.3"' Article 20(2) of the ICCPR,
much like Article 19(3), should be read as a limitation on an
individual's right under Article 19(1) and (2) of the ICCPR to hold
and exchange opinions and ideas.
Thus, the UDHR, the Discrimination Convention, and the
ICCPR place few, if any, restrictions on states to curtail individual
freedom of expression in cases of pornography and hate speech.
The margin of discretion standard expounded by the HRC in
Hertzberg and Others v. Finland is so deferential to state authority
that states can censor almost any kind of communications that they
label to be pornographic.30 ' Likewise, in the case of hate speech,
the UDHR's public safety, morals and general welfare exception
plus the HRC's holdings in cases like MA. v. Italy and J.R.T. and
W. G. Party v. Canada, proves that hate speech is outside the realm
of expression to be protected by these international agreements.30 2
V. Conclusion
The Internet is not some otherworldly creation immune to
national regulation. Internet servers, computers, and users all exist
296 Id. at 27.
297 Id. at 28.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 See id.
301 See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 264, at 467.
302 See id. at 490-91.
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in real time and in a real place. International declarations and
covenants such as the UDHR, the Discrimination Convention and
the ICCPR which deal with freedom of expression issues
essentially give state actors a blank check to curtail freedom of
expression.
The only real limits to national regulation of the Internet are
found in the internationally accepted principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction." 3 Here, the overriding limitation on whether a state
can regulate a foreign Internet service or content provider is
reasonableness.0 4  Whether a state asserts extraterritorial
jurisdiction under the objective territorial principle30 5 or under a
more refined targeting analysis, 36 states are within their rights to
assert reasonable jurisdiction over an actor who commits an
offense on foreign soil, if the harmful.effects of the offense are felt
in the forum state. Reasonableness is essentially a balancing test
weighing the seriousness of the local harm versus the individual
rights that are being impinged on. Furthermore, for extraterritorial
jurisdiction to be considered reasonable there should be a
substantial connection between the foreign actor and the forum
state.30 7
In dealing with commercial Internet content and service
providers, reasonableness under a targeting-based analysis can be
measured in terms of contracts, technology and implied
knowledge.30 8 Commercial content and service providers like
Yahoo! Inc. and CompuServe can insulate themselves from being
subjected to the jurisdiction of a foreign court by using forum
selection clauses and choice of law clauses, by requiring
affirmative consumer responses to such contract limitations, and
by employing the latest blocking software. If a commercial site
does everything within its powers to limit the offensive material,
then the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction lacks the element
of reasonableness required to make such an assertion a legitimate
exercise of state power.
The one area where extraterritorial jurisdiction should be
303 See supra Part III.
304 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
305 See supra Part III (c).
306 See supra Part III (d).
307 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 312.
308 Geist, supra note '103, at 602.
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presumably impermissible involves non-commercial websites
maintained by individuals. While their domestic jurisdictions are,
of course, free to regulate the content of their sites, it is
unreasonable for a nation to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over
a non-citizen residing outside of its borders. First, such an
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction offends the internationally
recognized principle that states should not intervene in the affairs
of other nations.30 9 Second, such an assertion is unreasonable
because private individuals, unlike commercial content and service
providers, do not have the resources and sophistication to employ
contracts and technology to limit their liability.
However, there are instances where extraterritorial jurisdiction
over private websites would be permissible under either
international law or the universality principle, primarily in the
cases of child pornography and incitement of war crimes and
genocide.3"' Under the universality principle, any website or
service provider engaged in child pornography would be subject to
extraterritorial jurisdiction, regardless of whether such an assertion
of jurisdiction was reasonable in terms of substantial contacts.311
The universally recognized consensus that child pornography is an
evil that should be eliminated enables states to prosecute offenders
outside of its borders such as in the case where Italian officials
prosecuted Russian citizens for running a child pornography
ring.3 " Also, international laws criminalizing war crimes and
genocide allow nations to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over
any website that incites these crimes.313
Thus, the Internet can be regulated at the national. level under
internationally recognized principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction
and international agreements addressing freedom of expression
issues. Even though many scholars worry that national regulation
of transnational phenomena like the Internet will hinder its growth,
these worries are overblown. The right to regulate does not equal
the ability to enforce a judgment. Furthermore, advancements in
blocking software technology plus international movement
towards a common Internet regime as exemplified by the Draft
309 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 313.
310 See supra Part III (e) and (f).
311 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 307-08.
312 Graham, Jr., supra note 198, at 458-59.
313 See BROWNLIE, supra note 59, at 307-08.
2002]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Treaty on Cybercrime 314 mean that the Internet will not be held
hostage to the community standards of some 180 different nations.
Despite nations' attempts to maximize the benefits of the Internet
while minimizing the dangers of hate speech and pornography
with regulations, the Internet will continue to grow and thrive.
WALTER C. DAUTERMAN, JR.
314 See supra note 205.
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